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1. Introduction 
The Directorate General for Transport and Energy (DG TREN) published its analysis of the prospects for the 
European single markets in electricity and gas (European Commission, 2007a) in January 2007. At the same 
time, the Directorate General for Competition (DG Competition) published its own inquiry on this subject 
(Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors 
(Final Report)) into the functioning of the European gas and electricity markets. Both reports gave a strong 
recommendation that the energy networks be unbundled at an ownership level from the wholesale and retail 
activities in the gas and electricity sectors. The reports assert (European Commission, 2007a, p 12 and 
European Commission, 2007b, p: 12): „Economic evidence shows that ownership unbundling is the most 
effective means to ensure choice for energy users and encourage investment.‟ However, there is no reference 
to the economic evidence that the Commission is referring to. In its Spring 2007 Competition Policy 
Newsletter (Lowe et al, 2007), the DG Competition staff attempt to justify this claim. While the article by 
Lowe contains a rider that the views expressed are not necessarily those of the European Communities, the 
lead author is Director-General for DG Competition. 
This paper reviews the evidence bought forward by the Commission to support its assertion on ownership 
unbundling.  
2. Background 
The first EU Directives on Electricity of 1996 (96/92/EC) and Gas from 1998 (98/30/EC) required that 
owners of the networks publish separate accounts that covered just their network businesses and excluded 
their activities in competitive markets (wholesale and retail). The Commission later judged this separation 
insufficient to prevent network owners from discriminating in favour of their retail and wholesale businesses 
in accessing the networks. In the 2003 revisions, 2003/54/EC (electricity) and 2003/55/EC (gas), legal 
separation was required. This meant that the networks had to be placed in a separate company, although the 
owners of this company could also be the owners of retail or wholesale energy businesses. As noted above, 
the Commission is now pressing for revisions to the Directives that would require that the owners of the 
network companies have no interest in gas or electricity wholesale and retail. 
3. Integration of wholesale and retail 
In DG Competition‟s preliminary report (European Commission, 2006), the Commission identified „vertical 
foreclosure‟ as one of the barriers to the creation of single European energy markets. For gas, the 
Commission found (European Commission, 2006, p 3): 
Lack of liquidity and limited access to infrastructure prevent new entrant suppliers from offering their 
services to the consumer. The network of long term supply contracts between gas producers and incumbent 
importers makes it very difficult for new entrants to access gas on the upstream markets. Additionally, certain 
features of these contracts limit incentives for incumbents to provide liquidity on traded markets. Gas infrastructure 
(networks and storage) is to a large extent owned by the incumbent gas importers, and the insufficient separation of 
this infrastructure from supply functions results in insufficient market opening. Despite EU rules on third party 
access and legal/functional unbundling, new entrants often lack effective access to networks, the operators of which 
are alleged to favour their own affiliates. 
For electricity, the Commission found: 
Vertical integration of generation, supply and network activities has remained a dominant feature in many 
electricity markets. Vertical integration of generation and retail reduces the incentives to trade on wholesale 
markets. Low levels of liquidity are an entry barrier. The strong links between supply and network companies 
reduces the economic incentives for the network operators to grant access to third parties. Many respondents are 
highly critical of the efficiency of existing unbundling obligations, believing that discrimination in favour of 
affiliates continues, and calling for stricter measures. 
Foreclosure seemed to cover integration of generation with retail and networks with generation/retail, with 
the former at least as prominent as the latter. 
From the policy point of view, the former would seem to be the more important problem. If wholesale 
markets are little used because retailers are buying their supplies from their wholesale divisions, the main 
justification for the reforms, turning the wholesale activity from a monopoly to a competitive market is 
heavily compromised. Price signals will not be reliable enough for power and gas to be bought in significant 
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quantities from the markets and will certainly not be reliable enough to provide signals that would be the 
basis for investments that might cost in the region of €1bn. By contrast, ensuring fair access to the networks 
is simply an enabling measure to allow the wholesale and retail markets to function efficiently. If, for other 
reasons, the markets cannot function efficiently, unbundling has little if any value. 
However, the final report by DG Competition and the DG TREN reports concentrated heavily on the 
integration of networks and wholesale/retail with little mention of integration of wholesale and retail. This is 
in spite of DG Competition acknowledging the failure of the wholesale markets. It finds: 
A chronic lack of liquidity, both in electricity and gas wholesale markets: the lifeblood for our markets is lacking 
and the market power of pre-liberalisation monopolies persists. 
However, it proposes no remedies for dealing with what it had acknowledged in its preliminary report as one 
of the main causes of this lack of liquidity, corporate integration of wholesale and retail activities. Lowe et al 
(2007) ignore the issue of integration of wholesale and retail. 
4. Problems with legal unbundling 
Much of the paper by Lowe et al (2007) is taken up with examples that emerged during the DG Competition 
Inquiry of integrated companies distorting competition. Three issues are identified as problems resulting 
form the inadequacy of legal unbundling: discrimination with respect to third party access; information 
leakage; and investment incentives remain distorted. 
„Discrimination with respect to third party access‟ and „information leakage‟ are the expected results of 
inadequate separation of activities with integrated companies. Lowe asserts that: „there are various means 
through which such discrimination may take place, some of which are difficult to detect and/or expeditiously 
remedy and sanction, even for a specialized regulatory body.‟ Yet the Competition Commission Inquiry was 
able to identify several examples of such practices. If a one-off inquiry covering all the Member States, by a 
body with no ongoing expertise in energy is able to uncover such practices, it is hard to understand why 
Lowe believes it would be so difficult for a regulatory body from a single country with a continuous mandate 
to monitor the energy sector to uncover such evidence. 
„Investment incentives remain distorted‟ is the most difficult to understand. Investment programmes must be 
the subject of regulatory approval (either ex post or ex ante) and if investments are undertaken that are not 
optimal or investments that are needed are not undertaken, this again points to serious deficiencies in the 
regulatory regime. It is not clear whether these deficiencies are the result of inadequate powers or inadequate 
resources with the regulator. 
5. The Commission’s evidence 
5.1. UK experience with gas 
Lowe provides as evidence, experience of unbundling the gas network in Britain. He identifies a price 
reduction of 50 per cent in network charges since 1990 and high levels of investment after unbundling (see 
Table 1). It is not clear what the investment figures represent, and unless they are better explained, with the 
underlying assumptions specified (for example, is inflation taken account of), they have no value. 
Table 1.  Changes in Investment levels in the British gas network 
Year Change of 
investment level 
(£m) 
Transco  
1997/98 147 
1998/99 191 
1999/2000 140 
Fully 
unbundled 
 
2000/01 228 
2001/02 239 
2002/03 182 
2003/04 159 
2004/05 128 
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2005/06 360 
Source: Lowe, P, Pucinskaite, I, Webster, W & Lindberg, P (2007) „Effective unbundling of energy transmission 
networks: lessons from the Energy Sector Inquiry‟ Competition Policy Newsletter, no 1, Spring 2007, p 30. 
The analysis is, however, misleading and sometimes inaccurate. The gas industry was privatised and 
liberalised in 1987, so it is not clear why 1990 was chosen as the base year since no major reforms took place 
in that year. British Gas was privatised in 1987 as a fully integrated wholesale/retail/network company. 
Over time, it has been broken up (Thomas, 2003). In 1997, the retail business was fully separated and 
continues to trade as Centrica. The wholesale and network business, BG Plc, continued as an integrated 
company until 2000, when the network business (the Transco division) was split off as a fully independent 
company, Lattice. Lattice, in turn, merged with the UK electricity transmission company, National Grid, to 
become National Grid Transco in 2002. In 2005, the British gas distribution network was split into eight 
regions, four of which were sold off at the instigation of the regulator. In terms of unbundling, the network 
has therefore only been ownership unbundled since 2000. It is not clear whether the large apparent increase 
in investment in 2005/06 may be related to this split. However, to make sense of these figures and 
understand how the 50 per cent reduction in prices was achieved, it is necessary to understand how network 
prices are set in Britain. 
5.1.1. Price-setting for networks in Britain: Setting the ‘X’ factors 
The orginal plan for the UK privatised network industries was that charges for the monopoly elements would 
be set using so-called „incentive regulation‟ using the RPI-X formula. Thus, prices for network services after 
1987 were set by this formula under which the price of the regulated service is allowed to increase by the 
rate of inflation (retail price index or RPI) minus an „X‟ factor. In effect, this formula means that the owner 
of the network must reduce its real costs by X per cent per year if it is to maintain its real level of profits. If it 
can reduce its costs by more than X per cent per year, it can keep the extra efficiency savings as extra profit, 
hence the incentive. 
Table 2 shows the „X‟ factors that have been applied since 1987 and shows that real prices have indeed fallen 
by about 50 per cent. 
Table 2.  UK Gas transmission/distribution charges since 1987 
Year X factor Transmission/distribution 
charge (1987=100) 
British Gas   
1988 2 98 
1989 2 96.1 
1990 2 94.2 
1991 2 92.3 
1992 4 88.8 
1993 4 85.4 
1994 4 82.1 
1995 4 78.9 
1996 4 75.9 
1997 21 60.0 
BG plc Transco 
division 
  
1998 2 58.8 
1999 2 57.6 
2000 2 56.4 
Lattice   
2001 2 55.3 
2002 4 53.1 
National Grid 
Transco 
  
2003 2 52.0 
2004 2 51.0 
2005 2 50.0 
2006 2 49.0 
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Source: Thomas, S (2003) „Gas as a commodity. The UK gas market: From nationalism to the embrace of the free 
market‟ in „European Gas Markets in Transition‟ ed Maarten Arentsen & Rolf Kunneke, Elsevier, pp 181-212. 
In practice, the „X‟ factor was only set in the way envisaged for the initial 5-year period. Under this first 
method, the regulator would be required to make a judgement on how much the regulated company would be 
able to improve its efficiency – the „X‟ factor. By 1991, when the regulator began to look at the „X‟ factor 
that would apply for the following five years, it was clear this method would not work and the only sensible 
way to set prices was to go back to a form of rate-of-return regulation similar to that applied in the USA 
since the 1930s. Under this, charges would be set so that the regulated company would be able to recover its 
operating costs in full and make a „fair‟ rate of return on the assets it built. So if operating costs were $500m, 
the assets owned were worth $5bn and the real annual fair rate of return was judged to be 10 per cent, the 
regulated company would be allowed to recover $1bn from its consumers made up of its operating costs of 
$500m plus 10 per cent of $5bn. This produces an allowed revenue stream for the 5-year period, which is 
presented as an „X‟ factor, but the methodology used is rate-of-return regulation, not incentive regulation. 
Rate-of-return regulation has been criticised because it can, if inadequately regulated, lead to „gold-plating‟ 
(the Averch-Johnson effect). The more the company invests the more money it is allowed to make so there is 
a strong incentive for the regulated company to overestimate its investment needs. Under the US ex post 
system, to prevent „gold-plating‟ US regulators review all major capital additions once they are complete 
before allowing them to be added to the „asset base‟. If the investment is not a good one (it must be „used, 
useful and the costs prudently incurred‟) the company is not allowed to recover some or all of cost of the 
asset and these disallowed costs must be paid for from its profits. The use of an ex post system means that it 
is the companies alone that make the investment decisions, not the regulator. 
In the UK, rate of return regulation is through an ex ante approach. The regulator agrees a 5-year forward 
programme of investments with the regulated company and the charges the regulator sets are based on the 
assumption that the company actually makes these investments. „Prudency‟ is therefore determined in 
advance and the regulator is effectively making investment decisions. The advantage of this approach is that 
companies have a longer time horizon to work with. The „Averch-Johnson‟ effect still applies and large 
investment programmes may simply indicate that the company has been successful in convincing the 
regulator that it needs to invest more than is actually needed. 
In practice, the UK regulated companies seem to be distorting this procedure to maximise their profits. They 
seldom if ever invest the full amount they have negotiated and they tend to make the investments towards the 
end of the five-year period. At the end of the regulated period, the regulator adjusts the asset base for the 
next forward period to reflect the investments actually made. But the company keeps the additional rate of 
return on the investments it did not make in that 5-year period. Investing later than anticipated also allows 
the company to start making a return on investment before the investment takes place. Regulators argue that 
to claw back this unearned profit from not investing or from delaying investment would mean that the 
company would have a disincentive to look for efficiencies in investment. So the companies have so far been 
allowed to keep these unearned profits. 
A major problem for the UK regulator when the change was made in 1991 from incentive regulation to rate-
of-return regulation was how to value pre-privatisation assets. British Gas had been sold for much less than 
its asset value, as shown in its pre-privatisation report and accounts, and to value the assets at their full pre-
privatisation level (minus of course usual depreciation) would have been to give the new owners a rate of 
return on much more than they had paid for the assets. The regulator therefore gave the pre-privatisation 
assets a much lower rate of return than the post-privatisation assets. This effectively wrote off much of the 
value of the pre-privatisation assets and led to large price cuts not related to efficiency gains. These price 
reductions are of course temporary as the pre-privatisation assets will have to be replaced at their full cost, so 
now in the UK, „X‟ factors are close to zero and in some cases are positive (i.e., prices rise in real terms). 
5.1.2. Outcomes 
Table 2 now begins to make more sense. The effect of the change from „incentive‟ regulation to „rate-of-
return‟ regulation is seen in the large price reductions from 1992-96 and the huge one-off cut in 1997. So of 
the 50 per cent price reduction that the Commission notes since liberalisation (1987, not 1990 as the Lowe 
mistakenly states), nearly all of it (85 per cent of the reduction) occurred before ownership unbundling. 
Peaks of investment occur in the last year of the 5-year regulatory cycle (2001 and 2006). Both these years 
occurred after ownership unbundling. The three years that Lowe shows for the „integrated‟ company do not 
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contain the last year of a 5-year regulatory cycle. On these grounds alone, Lowe‟s evidence is massively 
distorted. 
5.1.3. Why does the regulated company invest? 
Lowe‟s analysis is clearly meant to imply that the regulated company makes autonomous decisions on where 
and how much to invest. This is a travesty of the truth. A 5-year investment programme is agreed in advance 
with the regulator in a complex negotiation lasting nearly 3 years. The regulated company always starts with 
a very high investment need because the larger the investment programme it can negotiate, the higher the 
profits it can make. While intuitively, a company making large investments in the network seems a good 
thing, in practice, it is only useful if the assets are needed and costs are kept down to a minimum. Consumers 
invariably pay the price for investment programmes. Over the three year negotiating period, the Regulator 
assesses the regulated company‟s programme, trimming out investments that the regulator believes are not 
necessary. 
So from a strategic point of view, a large investment programme may prove very little and certainly not that 
ownership unbundling is better than legal unbundling. 
5.1.4. Conclusions 
Lowe‟s evidence from Britain is confused and suggests that he does not understand the system of regulation. 
He is muddled about whether the criterion for judging the reforms is price reductions or level of investment. 
These tend to be mutually exclusive. Price reductions are likely to be possible only if investment levels are 
low, while large investment programmes must be paid for by consumers, tending to increase prices. 
5.2. The Netherlands 
Lowe‟s other evidence is from the Netherlands, apparently based on the fact that the unbundled network 
operator has started work on an LNG terminal. However, since the network operator has only been 
unbundled since 2005, it seems far too early to draw any conclusions. Lowe also asserts that the boom (sic) 
of LNG terminals in Spain was „significantly facilitated by (progressive) unbundling‟. Without evidence to 
back up that the terminals would not otherwise have been built and that they were a good use of consumers‟ 
money, such assertions are worthless. 
6. Other evidence 
The Commission provides little independent evidence to back its assertion that „Economic evidence shows 
that ownership unbundling is the most effective means to ensure choice for energy users and encourage 
investment.‟ The main support comes from Newbery (2005). While Newbery is a highly respected and 
independent commentator, there are other arguments that favour retention legal unbundling. These relate to 
scale economies and transaction costs and include (Dahlman, 1979) „search and information costs,   
bargaining and decision costs and enforcement costs‟.  
6.1. Ensuring effective stewardship of the assets 
There is also the issue of who should own the networks if the traditional gas and electric utilities are 
disqualified from doing so. Ownership of the transmission network has, in the past, always been in the hands 
of the dominant generation company for the region or the nation for which the franchise company has its 
territory. Such companies almost invariably operated as single mission companies in their given territory. 
This arrangement gives the company a very strong incentive to maintain a transmission system to the highest 
standards with a long-term time horizon. Any weakness in the system will expose the company‟s customers 
(final consumers for a fully integrated company or distribution companies for partly integrated companies) to 
poor service, which will damage their reputation and will ultimately put in jeopardy the company‟s right to 
serve their given territory. 
The break-up of integrated companies means that the link between company and consumers is much 
weakened and also that the nature of the companies involved in network management will change. Where 
ownership unbundling has occurred, the traditional companies have tended to opt to divest their network 
activities and choose to concentrate on their generation/retail activities. The companies involved in 
electricity have also expanded their scale and scope, moving into new territories and new activities. For 
example, companies like E.ON and EDF now have interests in markets across Europe as well as their 
traditional home bases. This may increasingly apply to network companies if they follow National Grid 
Transco‟s example. National Grid Transco, the electricity transmission company for England & Wales now 
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operates much of the electricity transmission network in New England (USA) and has taken over ownership 
of most of the British gas transmission and distribution network. These changes in corporate policy mean 
that assets in the electricity industry have become much more mobile. In liberalised countries such as the 
UK, some network assets have changed ownership several times in the past decade. 
There is little evidence yet on what type of company will move into the transmission sector. The longer 
established independent electricity transmission companies, e.g., National Grid (UK) and RED (Spain) have 
not yet been subject to takeover bids, but there is no reason to assume this will not happen. Some countries 
have chosen not to take the risk that transmission networks might fall into the hands of companies that will 
exploit the assets to the detriment of service by taking (or retaining) the transmission sector into public 
ownership. In the Nordic countries, the unbundled transmission companies are nationally owned. 
The mobility of assets raises the fear that assets will be „sweated‟ by owners with short-term time-horizons 
and sold on before the extent of their neglect is apparent. Adverse trends in network performance are often 
difficult to detect because variations in weather from year to year cause a large amount of variability in 
performance indicators. When the neglect is apparent, the cost of remedying the problem may be 
disproportionately high. 
Even amongst MEPs that support ownership unbundling, there are concerns about networks being owned by 
private equity funds. For example, UK MEP Eluned Morgan was reported as wanting hedge funds and 
private equity groups to be barred from buying infrastructure unless they guarantee investment. While this is 
well-meaning, it assumes that investment guarantees can be made to stick and that public companies will not 
exploit their ownership of monopoly facilities unfairly. The Spanish company, Ferrovial, has come under 
severe criticism from the UK Competition Commission for its lack of investment since it took over the main 
UK airport operator BAA. 
6.2. The cost of unbundling 
Legal and ownership unbundling will inevitably have initial costs and may well have ongoing costs. The 
initial costs will be the cost of setting up a new company, including the recruitment of a new management 
team, setting up headquarters and creation of new operating systems where these were previously shared 
with a generation or retail business. There may be ongoing costs from loss of scale economies. If the 
company is relatively small compared to the previous arrangement there may be other costs. For example, a 
small company is likely to have a higher cost of capital than a large one, a small company might be less 
effective in carrying out the necessary training and might have less scope to carry out R&D.  
7. Differences between transmission and distribution 
The Commission and Lowe do not distinguish between the transmission and distribution systems in terms of 
unbundling and does not recognise that differences might lead to changes in the way they are treated. The 
transmission systems are highly strategic and require important decisions to be taken on the siting of power 
plants, the use of gas import facilities (pipelines and LNG terminals). The integrity of national transmission 
systems is also vital. If the national transmission system is not capable of meeting the requirements imposed 
upon it, the national consequences will be extremely serious. 
In terms of its contribution to the overall cost of electricity, transmission is a relatively small element, 
accounting for perhaps 5 per cent of the price of electricity for small consumers, less for larger consumers. 
This compares to perhaps 30 per cent for the distribution charge. Transmission also employs relatively few 
people, for example, in Britain, a couple of thousand people are employed to operate and maintain the 
transmission system, while the distribution system employs perhaps ten times as many. The distribution 
network is the vital link for final consumers but while a weakness in a local distribution network is not 
acceptable, it will have limited national consequences. The distribution network also has limited strategic 
considerations. For gas, where the network is incomplete, there are decisions to be taken on which 
consumers to connect and when. For electricity, effectively all consumers are connected and the only 
strategic decisions are on small-scale generation sources, which are usually „embedded‟ in the distribution 
network rather than feeding in to the transmission network. However, this requires only that new sources can 
feed into the network at a fair price, not the need to choose between options. 
As a result of these differences, transmission is often seen as a strategic national asset that should be under 
public ownership, even where the rest of the system is being privatised. For example, Denmark and the 
Netherlands have chosen to bring the electricity transmission network into national public ownership. 
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The strategic nature of the transmission network also has consequences for regulation. Regulators do not 
have „perfect‟ information and must strike a balance in setting network tariffs. The targets must be tough 
enough to force companies to be as efficient as possible and not so tough that there is a risk that the owner 
will not have the resources to operate the system reliably. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the only 
time a regulator will know that they have not been too lenient is when the system collapses or the owner files 
for bankruptcy. Clearly for transmission, the regulator needs to err in favour of the network owner to avoid 
any risk of compromising the security of the network. Excessive profits for the network owner (especially if 
publicly owned) or not maximising pressures for efficiency will be a small price to pay to reduce the risk of 
network failure.  
Regulators, in an attempt to emulate large cost reduction achieved by their international counterparts or to 
demonstrate that liberalisation does work, may be tempted to force down network charges below their 
sustainable level. Networks can be neglected for a few years with little sign of the neglect in terms of system 
reliability, but while squeezing down network charges in this way may seem to produce benefits for 
consumers in the short-term, in the long-term, consumers will pay heavily for these short-term gains. A 
particular issue, especially if networks are fully unbundled is instability of ownership. In Britain, some of the 
distribution networks have passed through several changes of ownership in just a few years. Particular care 
needs to be taken with new owners with unproven track-records that these companies are not just „sweating 
the assets‟, keeping the savings under incentive regulation schemes, for high short-term profits expecting to 
sell before their neglect becomes apparent. 
8. Weak regulation 
The Commission in both its reports is highly critical of the capability of some of the regulatory bodies. For 
example, the DG Competition report recommends a strengthened regulatory framework, including1: 
- enhanced powers for independent national energy regulators,  
- reinforced coordination between national energy regulators,  
- reinforced cooperation between Transmission System Operators (TSO), and  
- substantially enhanced consistency of regulation in cross-border issues. 
DG TREN found „Insufficient competences of the regulators‟.2 Privately, the Commission is scathing in its 
views on some of the regulatory bodies and this is apparent in some of the country reviews that accompany 
the DG TREN report3. 
Intuitively, it would seem that ensuring fair access to the networks was a rather basic task for a competent 
regulatory authority. If a regulator is unable to enforce this, there must be serious doubts as to whether it will 
be able to regulate the sector adequately in other respects. The obvious priority would appear to be to 
strengthen the competence of the regulatory bodies so that the existing provisions of the Directive are 
enforced. Until this has been done, it is premature to judge that the existing Directive is inadequate. 
9. Conclusions 
The evidence presented by Lowe to support DG TREN and DG Competition‟s assertion that „Economic 
evidence shows that ownership unbundling is the most effective means to ensure choice for energy users and 
encourage investment‟ is weak and confused. The examples from UK, Netherlands and Spain are anecdotal 
and, in the case of the UK, betray a lack of understanding of the British system of regulation of networks. 
Lowe and the Commission continue to make arguments based on their interpretation of experience with 
transmission and then assume, with no supporting arguments that the same logic will apply to distribution. 
There is no recognition that unbundling has costs as well as theoretical benefits much less any analysis 
whether the benefits outweigh the costs. The issue of whether a fully unbundled company can be sure to 
provide good long-term stewardship of the network is also ignored. 
The Commission is highly critical of the capabilities and powers of national regulatory bodies. The first 
priority would appear to be solving this issue. Competitive energy sectors that do not have a competent and 
                                                     
1 European Commission (2007) „Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas 
and electricity sectors (Final Report)‟ {SEC(2006) 1724}, Brussels, p 13-14. 
2 European Commission (2007) „Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market‟ {SEC(2007) 12}, Brussels, p 7. 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/10_internal_market_country_reviews_en.pdf  
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effective regulatory body are likely to suffer many problems, with lack of fair access to networks unlikely to 
be the most serious. 
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